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Abstract 
The inherent risky nature of public-private partnerships requires contractors to make detailed and 
expensive project proposals. These high bidding costs are often seen as a burden for contractors 
to enter the playing field. Governments are seeking for ways to increase competition. It is a 
common belief that a project pipeline could succeed in triggering contractors’ enthusiasm. The 
goal of this paper is to theoretically assess whether the pipeline serves as an effective tool to levy 
the barrier to entry. Therefore, a theoretical model and a simulation experiment that mimics the 
tendering process with heterogeneity in the bidders’ cost structure are presented. In particular, 
the impact of a project pipeline on the ex ante bid preparation effort willingness and the targeted 
mark-ups is assessed. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is heuristically approximated for scenarios 
with varying project characteristics. A statistical analysis of the experimental results approves 
that mark-ups are lower when more projects are included in the pipeline. As a consequence, this 
leads to fiercer price competition and a lower procurement cost for the government. Nonetheless, 
the incentive creation with respect to investment efforts is limited according to the experiment. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper offers a theoretical approach in analyzing the procurement stage of a sequence of 
public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Because of its complexity and riskiness, long-term 
PPP projects require more preparation than traditional infrastructure projects. After an initial 
prequalification of interested consortia by the government, qualified concessionaires are invited 
for tender. The consortia have to prepare a proposal that will be submitted to the government 
which involves pre-tender research costs (e.g., consulting costs, design costs and market studies). 
Empirical evidence by KPMG (2010) reports average research costs of 1.5% to 2% of the total 
project cost. These pre-tender research costs or bidding costs are claimed to be a burden for the 
concessionaires because they do not guarantee to be awarded with the contract (Carrillo et al. 
2008). Basically, each consortium will first decide how much money it is willing to invest in pre-
tender research and secondly, the appropriate mark-up is determined. Due to the complexity, the 
high contingencies and the bidding costs, policy makers often argue that the market is too narrow 
in some jurisdictions, like in Australia, New Zealand or western European countries where often 
only two or three private entities show interest in particular high-risk PPPs.  
Governments are seeking for ways to open up the playing field and incentivize the consortia 
to submit qualitative bid proposals and for possible entrants to penetrate the market. A recent 
KPMG report (2010) concludes with a set of guidelines to improve the efficiency of the PPP 
process and to reduce the bid costs which would in its turn stimulate the PPP market’s 
attractiveness. Moreover, and supported by empirical evidence in Canada for instance, a pipeline 
of projects could increase the eagerness of consortia to enter and stay in the PPP market of a 
particular country (KPMG 2010). This pipeline reduces a consortium’s risk of being 
unsuccessful, because instead of putting all one’s eggs in one basket, a consortium can spread 
out its investments across different projects and it can offset former losses in future tenders. Due 
to the high cost and the extensive timeframe of PPP projects, the pipeline is usually of a limited 
nature. Governments change and long-term public budgets are hard to predict.  
This paper extends the single-project PPP bidding model of De Clerck and Demeulemeester 
(2014) and translates the pipeline concept into a theoretical multi-project procurement model. 
The purpose is to determine an ex ante strategy for the bidders. This is useful for two reasons. 
Firstly, the tendering procedure is often time-consuming and therefore, contractors often have to 
undertake bid preparations for several projects at the same time. Moreover, organizing a 
3 
 
consortium involves fixed costs that may be depreciated across multiple projects. Therefore, an 
ex ante strategy for a bidder is defined by a budgeted bid preparation effort (i.e., the investment 
decision) and a budgeted mark-up percentage (i.e., the mark-up decision). Furthermore, the 
bidders are heterogeneous in their experience levels. The past experience a bidder has obtained 
might lead to an increased ability to estimate the project cost on the one hand and to efficiency 
gains that result in a lower expected cost on the other hand. The contractors’ pay-offs are 
obtained through simulation and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is heuristically approximated. 
Subsequently, the scope is extended to the government to assess the reflection of the 
governmental policy mechanisms into the dynamics of the bidding behavior. On the one hand, 
public institutions are interested in the effect of the project pipeline on the procurement cost and, 
on the other hand, the impact of an investment reimbursement policy is investigated in a multi-
project setting. De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014) show in a single-project setting that 
compensations for the losers’ investment efforts influence the bidding behavior and result into a 
more levelled playing field.  
Next to its contribution to the PPP procurement literature, which only rarely considers 
competitive mechanisms, this study contributes to the procurement auction literature. It offers a 
methodological approach that favors the practical soundness of the model over limited analytical 
results that are subject to stringent assumptions. From a procurement auction perspective, this 
setting pioneers in combining the heterogeneity among bidders, the uncertainty in the project 
outcome and the possibility to shape the cost distribution in a multi-unit auction format without 
information revelation. The results offer a theoretical foundation for the introduction of policy 
guidelines that are in both the public as well as the private sector’s interest. The triangulation 
through the qualitative validation and discussion of our findings guarantees the practical 
applicability and acted as a sounding board to identify the cases where our theoretical findings 
would be interfered by external assumptions or human factors.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the bridge 
with traditional auction theory and maps the PPP procurement process within the field. Section 3 
covers the analytical foundation and subsequently recapitulates and extends the algorithm that 
has been implemented for the equilibrium identification. The theoretical findings that result from 
the simulation output are statistically analyzed in Section 4. These outcomes are balanced against 
the qualitative findings and comments from practitioners in the global PPP field in Section 5. 
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The paper concludes with some policy guidelines and highlights the extensions for further 
consideration.  
2. Literature review 
The study of the PPP competitive bidding model that is addressed in this paper is highly 
intertwined with auction theory. The multi-unit auction deserves particular interest in order to 
position the competitive PPP procurement model with a pipeline of projects. Multiple units 
might be auctioned simultaneously, so that bidders could bid on different packages of objects. 
Next to applications in electricity markets (Triki et al. 2005) and procurement markets (e.g., 
Chilean school meals in Catalán et al. 2009) on the public side, also the transport (Triki et al. 
2014) and retail industry (Aissaoui et al. 2007) rely on the combinatorial auction mechanism. 
Well-supported by the growth of online auctions, the combinatorial auction design has received 
considerable attention within the operations research community (e.g., de Vries and Vohra 2003, 
Pekeč and Rothkopf 2003, Olivares et al. 2012). On the other hand, which may also be 
applicable in the PPP market, auctioning may be organized in a strictly sequential fashion. 
Within the sequential auction field, an important question relates to the price trend of the objects 
in the sequence. Although Weber (1983) proved that bids follow a Martingale in the case of an 
uncertain common value, the majority of auction studies claims that bid prices are declining. 
Early examples include Von der Fehr (1994) who studies auctions with a participation cost, 
Branco (1997) who considers complementarities between objects and Jeitschko (1999) for the 
case where the second auction only occurs with an exogenous probability. The declining price 
effect is usually attributed to the decreased competition in later stages due to capacity 
constraints. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), however, relates the cost trend to the cost distribution 
of the stochastically equivalent objects. Besides the reduced competition, the author introduces a 
second effect that is related to the number of remaining chances to win in the case of a one unit 
demand. Additionally, Menezes and Monteiro (2004) claim that the trend depends on the 
synergies of the objects. Although we do not account for capacity constraints, our setting 
supports these findings from a procurement perspective in the sense that the lowest bidder wins 
the project opposed to the highest bidder in a traditional auction. The players’ ex ante strategies 
consist of lower mark-ups for earlier projects in the pipeline, meaning that bidding is more 
aggressive in the early stages.  
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The sequential auction has received increased attention and studies are generally categorized 
according to dimensions related to the objects’ and bidders’ characteristics. In order to guarantee 
the analytical manageability, a lot of studies limit themselves to a two-stage model (e.g., Branco 
1997, Elmaghraby 2003, De Silva et al. 2005, Zeithammer 2009, Reiβ and Schöndube 2010, 
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2014), while other formats look at Markov strategies in more 
extensive finite sequences (e.g., Katehakis and Puranam 2012, Takano et al. 2014) or account for 
an infinite timeframe (e.g., Oren and Rothkopf 1975, Zeithammer 2007, Hörner and Jamison 
2008, Said 2011). In line with experience from practice, the PPP pipeline has a finite nature. This 
is due to the magnitude of the projects and the fact that government budgets have a limited time 
horizon. Our model develops an ex ante strategy, so that there are no proper sub-games for the 
different stages in the game and so that the strategy determination is simultaneous. Another 
object-related dimension concerns the relationship between the auctioned objects. The objects 
can have a homogeneous nature in the sense that they are perfect substitutes (Katzman 1999, 
Zeithammer 2009) or stochastically equivalent (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994, Reiβ and Schöndube 
2010, Said 2011). Alternatively, synergies or the complementary feature of objects has proven to 
significantly influence strategic behavior (Branco 1997, Benoit and Krishna 2001, Menezes and 
Monteiro 2004, De Silva et al. 2005). The PPP model accounts for experience and learning 
effects, so that more competition could be expected in earlier stages of the game. An additional 
set of dimensions is related to the bidders. On the one hand, the capacity constraint diversifies 
the modeling approaches. The contributions of Milgrom and Weber (1982), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1994), Elmaghraby (2003) and Reiβ and Schöndube (2010) are limited to a single unit 
demand, while Katzman (1999), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and Katehakis and Puranam 
(2012) allow for the procurement of as many items as possible. Other models have constraints in 
the monetary capabilities (Pitchik 2009) or in the availability of man-hours (Takano et al. 2014). 
Last but not least, the research topics can be differentiated according to the identity of the 
bidders. Most papers deal with the same set of contractors and often take only two bidders into 
account. At the other end of the spectrum, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), Yildirim (2004) 
and Said (2011) allow for the entry of new buyers. The PPP model of this paper reduces 
complexity in the sense that it only considers a limited number of suppliers and situations 
without capacity constraints. 
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Furthermore, the PPP framework introduces three features that have only limitedly been 
studied in a theoretical fashion. Firstly, there is an important distinction between traditional 
auction theory and competitive bidding. An important aspect of competitive bidding is that bid 
prices are based on estimates of the project cost. This has been addressed in its earliest form by 
Friedman (1956). These cost estimates are subject to inaccuracies that also affect the bid price, as 
the bid price is usually correlated to the estimated cost (Naert and Weverbergh 1978, King and 
Mercer 1990, Takano et al. 2014). Hence, the inaccuracies are better grasped by the introduction 
of a mark-up that is applied to the estimated cost. Nevertheless, this complicates the winning 
probability calculations (King and Mercer 1990). This is in contrast with traditional auction 
theory that does not account for these uncertainties.  
Another PPP peculiarity relates to the heterogeneity among bidders. From a practical 
perspective, it is important to look into discrepancies in the contractors’ levels of experience. 
Maskin and Riley (2000) argue that asymmetric auctions are generally not tractable with 
analytical methods. In a sequential auction format, asymmetries could occur in a second auction 
because of differences in completion cost between the bidder that has won the first auction and 
the other players (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2014). Empirical research has studied the 
complementarity of contracts, like Wolfram (1998) for sequential electricity contracts with start-
up prices, Anton and Yao (1987) in the defense sector and De Silva et al. (2005) for road 
infrastructure contracts. The asymmetry is an endogenous consequence. Nonetheless, our 
research will also consider exogenous heterogeneity, so that at each stage of the game, bidders 
may have different cost distributions. Reiβ and Schöndube (2010) start with differences in the 
project completion cost in the context of two sequentially tendered, stochastically equivalent 
projects and capacity constraints and describe the deviation from the standard independent 
private value auction. Moreover, the assumption of first order stochastic dominance is usually 
applied (Maskin and Riley 2000). The model of this paper relaxes this assumption. Being in an 
advantageous position has a double impact: the expected value of the cost distribution is lower, 
but also the variance of the cost distribution is smaller.  
Finally, the PPP format is a form of an all-pay auction. Bidders invest money and resources to 
set up a project proposal. These investments could lead to more qualitative proposals, a decline 
in the expected project cost and a decrease in the project cost uncertainty. Empirical research 
acknowledges that bidding for PPPs is expensive (Carrillo et al. 2008, Chen and Doloi 2008) and 
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is even perceived as a barrier to entry (KPMG 2010). In order to incentivize consortia, 
governments may reimburse bidders for the bidding cost. In a game-theoretical model, Ho 
(2008) studies the impact of a lump-sum reimbursement with homogeneous bidders. Ho argues 
against a compensation, but this is in contrast to De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014) who 
consider heterogeneous bidders and favor compensations in a three-player setting with gaps in 
the experience levels. From an auction perspective, Arozamena and Cantillon (2002) expect 
fiercer competition in the presence of incentives and Rothkopf et al. (2003) show a decline in the 
procurement cost. Both studies look at single-shot auctions and do only consider cost benefits 
without uncertainty reductions. 
In order to attain analytical results, assumptions simplify the often complex bidding contexts. 
Relaxations of these assumptions make the analysis very hard. King and Mercer (1988) 
acknowledge this issue in their review paper and claim that probabilistic strategies are hard to 
study. Simulations highly contribute to the study of a complex environment and simultaneously 
allow for flexibility, which also benefits managerial decision makers. Mehlenbacher (2007) 
shows the increasing interest of multi-agent technology to study interactions among agents and 
strategies in complex environments. Recent applications of numerical simulations have proven to 
gain insights into complex auction and procurement formats (Cai and Wurman 2005, Farnia et al. 
2013, Takano et al. 2014). Alternatively, laboratory experiments have also been a common 
means to analyze bidding behavior in a sequential procurement context (e.g., Brosig and Reiβ 
2007, Cason et al. 2011). 
3. Methodology 
Combining contemporary PPP research and the view of practitioners from the public and 
private perspective has led to a framework with a manageable level of abstraction and that 
generalizes country- and sector-specific peculiarities. Due to the proliferation of decision 
variables and the non-linear nature of the problem, only a characterization of the equilibrium is 
possible. A simulation approach and algorithms to approximate the bidding behavior dynamics 
give interesting results. The model is consistent with De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014), but 
the extensions are highlighted. 
3.1. The procurement model 
The bidders (also called the contractors in the remainder of the text) are usually consortia that 
consist of designers, subcontractors, maintenance companies, et cetera. The PPP model in this 
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paper makes abstraction of the internal structure of the consortium or special purpose vehicle. 
Given is a project pipeline that has been clearly communicated by the government. The decision 
maker (i.e., the public party) determines the number of shortlisted bidders, which is usually 
between two and five depending on the market environment and the complexity of the project. 
We will assume that the number of bidders and their identity is constant over the pipeline. The 
shortlisted contractors will thus develop a project proposal with among other things project data, 
design details and the financial information. Due to the long-term time span, the magnitude and 
the entailed risk of PPPs, a lot of effort needs to be put into these proposals. These pre-tender 
research and development exertions come at a cost. Moreover, each contractor will determine the 
required mark-up that accounts for the aimed profit and the mitigation of risk. The project 
information and the bidding environment information that consists of the number of bidders and 
their respective competitive positions affect these decisions. After the proposals have been 
received, the government will make a decision based on the assessment of the cost and the 
quality of the submitted proposals.  
3.2. An ex ante strategy for the PPP pipeline 
The government initiates and communicates the project pipeline. The tendering processes are 
often long or overlapping and sometimes contractors have to make investments for future 
projects. Therefore, in this ex ante framework, there is no immediate information revelation so 
that contractors cannot change their strategy along the line which makes it a simultaneous game.  
This also means that his ex ante strategy is based on the expected beliefs whether he will win or 
lose a project before moving to the next project in the pipeline. Alternatively, a fully dynamic 
model would build a strategy pattern that prescribes the strategic behavior first for the initial 
project and would then determine the strategy for the second project for each possible outcome 
(i.e., for each possible winner) of the first project.  
The purpose is to determine the influence of a project pipeline on the ex ante strategy 
determination. It is assumed that the number of bidders is expected to be the same over the 
course of the projects. Consequently, the initial experience levels of the shortlisted bidders are 
common knowledge. A sub-game 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) refers to the combination of experience 
levels and a discrete number of experience levels ranging from zero (i.e., no experience) to ten 
(i.e., maximum experience) is developed. In sub-game 𝑒 contractor 𝑝 determines his optimal 
strategy 𝑠𝑝
∗ for the entire project pipeline with 𝑍 projects. An ex ante strategy 𝑠𝑝 is composed of 
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two decisions for each project 𝑧 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑍} in the pipeline: an investment decision 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝), that 
is expressed as a percentage of an initially set project cost base, and a mark-up decision 𝑚𝑧(𝑠𝑝), 
that is expressed as a percentage value and which is applied to the estimated project cost. The 
strategy for player 𝑝 is represented by a vector 
𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖1(𝑠𝑝),𝑚1(𝑠𝑝), 𝑖2(𝑠𝑝),𝑚2(𝑠𝑝),… , 𝑖𝑍(𝑠𝑝),𝑚𝑍(𝑠𝑝)) with 𝑖𝑧 and 𝑚𝑧 respectively the 
investment percentage and mark-up percentage for project 𝑧. The investment level refers to the 
monetary effort that the contractor is willing to put into developing the project proposal. These 
costs could be lobbying costs, design and market study costs and working costs of the 
consortium. R&D research and project management research believe in the dual impact of pre-
tender investment: it leads to more accurate cost estimates, reducing the project risk, and 
innovations or efficiencies could directly decrease the expected project cost (Martzoukous and 
Zacharias 2013, Lippman et al. 2013). Each contractor simultaneously determines his optimal 
strategy so it is in our goals to identify the bidding equilibria. A (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium 
strategy profile 𝑠∗ = (𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠𝑃
∗) for sub-game 𝑒 refers to the combination of strategies for the 
players in which none of the bidders has an incentive to deviate from his current strategy choice 
𝑠𝑝
∗ given the strategy combination of his opponents 𝑠−𝑝
∗ . With 𝑓𝑝(. ) the pay-off function for 
player 𝑝, this is mathematically expressed as: ∀ 𝑝, 𝑠𝑝 ∈ 𝑆𝑝: 𝑓𝑝(𝑠𝑝
∗ , 𝑠−𝑝
∗ ) ≥ 𝑓𝑝(𝑠𝑝, 𝑠−𝑝
∗ ). 
Looking at the procurement process from a public angle, the government is the principal in 
shaping the bidding environment and is in fact able to influence the equilibrium bidding 
behavior. Firstly, it determines the number of shortlisted bidders that are invited for the tender. 
Secondly, the government is the decision maker and independently defines how much emphasis 
will be placed on the cost and the quality while assessing the proposals. Thirdly, which has 
already been tackled in a previous study, the government may decide upon the compensation 
policy towards the losing bidders. The public entity can reimburse a fraction of the investment 
cost of (some of) the losing bidders. Last but not least, which is the major subject of this paper, 
the government could launch several projects so that bidders believe that it is not a single-shot 
game, but that there are future opportunities available. 
3.3.  Model assumptions 
The model assumptions from De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014) are extrapolated to the 
issue of the project pipeline. The PPP market is in general heterogeneous. Practitioners from both 
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the public as well as the private angle distinguish inexperienced entrants from mature, well-
established incumbent consortia. In an academic vein, Oo et al. (2010) experimentally conclude 
that bidders’ bidding behavior is diverse. Therefore, a first assumption concerns the introduction 
of an experience scale related to the number of projects a contractor has executed within a 
particular market. 
Assumption 1: The bidding environment information that consists of the number of bidders and 
their respective experience levels is common knowledge. Winning a contract results in an 
experience level increase. 
An important assumption for the strategic model is related to the exogeneity of the bidding 
environment. In the entire project pipeline, no new players enter the game and the same set of 
players are considered for each project. Nevertheless, winning a project may result in a 
knowledge and cost advantage in later tenders. Moreover, also the finite pipeline of projects is 
assumed to be common knowledge and, without taking experience and investment into account, 
all projects have a stochastically equivalent nature.  
Assumption 2: The project pipeline is commonly known and each project has the same risk and 
cost structure. The same set of bidders is considered for the entire project pipeline. 
A final assumption that is related to the dynamic modeling and that offers opportunities for 
extensions, concerns the budgetary and resource requirements. 
Assumption 3: Each player is assumed to be capable of performing all projects in the pipeline 
and has sufficient resources at his disposal. 
The remainder of the assumptions are related to the distributions and decision variables of 
each individual project in the pipeline. Uncertainty in the project outcome and the project risks 
are aggregated and translated into a single measure: the variance of the cost and associated bid 
probability distribution for each player. Complex or risky projects like toll roads or hospitals 
have wider distributions than social housing projects for instance. These distributions are 
dependent on the experience level of the bidder and the amount of money he has invested in 
research. On the one hand, it is expected that a consortium that has invested a lot in design or 
market studies is able to mitigate particular PPP risks and to more accurately estimate the project 
cost. Implementation-wise, it means that a contractor may narrow the cost probability 
distribution. Nevertheless, a bidder can only reduce the controllable part of the risk (e.g., project 
risk, demand risk), but not the uncontrollable part (e.g., force majeure risk, macroeconomic risk). 
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On the other hand, experience and pre-tender investment will directly shift the distribution to the 
left, which results in a lower expected cost. The appropriation of experience may lead to 
efficiency gains and cost saving innovations may result from R&D. An alternative interpretation, 
but with a slightly different implementation, is related to the government’s decision mechanism 
that might be built on a cost/quality trade-off of the proposal. Quality could be defined in 
monetary terms and the government might reduce a bidder’s price with a discount that represents 
the value the decision maker attributes to experience and to the quality of the proposal, related to 
a contractor’s pre-tender investment. This is a variation on the cost adjustment implementation of 
Kostamis et al. (2009). This flexible approach validates the fact that the model’s decision maker 
selects the lowest bidding contractor as the preferred bidder. Finally, risk neutrality is assumed, 
so that bidders want to optimize their expected pay-off. 
Assumption 4: The complexity or risk of a project is translated into the variance of the cost 
distribution and consists of a controllable part and an uncontrollable part. 
Assumption 5: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has invested in pre-
tender research, the lower the variance of the cost probability distribution (knowledge impact 
assumption). 
Assumption 6: The more experienced a player is and the more a contractor has invested in pre-
tender research, the lower the expected project cost (direct cost assumption). 
Assumption 7: All participants in the game are able to make accurate estimations of the 
parameters that are related to assumptions 4-6. 
Assumption 8: The government selects the lowest bidding contractor. In case of a bidding cost 
reimbursement policy, bid compensations are equally credited to all losing bidders. 
Assumption 9: Contractors maximize their expected pay-off. 
Section 3.2 highlighted the strategy vector that is composed of the decision variables that 
reflect the strategic choices for each project in the pipeline. In order to reduce the complexity, the 
number of decisions has been kept to a minimum which results in two bidding models: a 
consistent strategy model (CSM) and a variable strategy model (VSM).  
Assumption 10.1: The consistent strategy model (CSM) imposes that a contractor selects a single 
investment percentage and a single mark-up percentage that is applied to all projects in the 
pipeline. 
12 
 
Assumption 10.2: The variable strategy model (VSM) allows a contractor to independently 
determine an investment percentage and a mark-up percentage for each project in the pipeline. 
The VSM allows for more flexibility, but the number of strategies explodes when more projects 
are included in the pipeline. Therefore, the constrained CSM model allows for longer pipelines, 
because a strategy in the CSM reflects an average investment and mark-up decision for the entire 
pipeline. 
3.4. Hypotheses 
The conclusions from consulting reports (KPMG 2010) and interviews with practitioners raise 
several hypotheses that are theoretically tested:  
Hypothesis 1: In equilibrium, the investment percentages are expected to be higher if the number 
of projects in the sequence is greater both in the CSM as well as in the VSM. 
Hypothesis 2: In equilibrium, the mark-up levels are expected to be decreasing if the number of 
projects in the sequence is greater both in the CSM as well as in the VSM. 
Hypothesis 3: In equilibrium, the investment and mark-up choices vary for the different projects 
of the VSM. 
Hypothesis 4: In equilibrium, the inhibiting effect of an increased number of players will be 
levelled off when the number of projects increases in both the CSM as well as in the VSM. 
Hypothesis 5: Government compensation policies will be less essential in the creation of a more 
competitive market if there is a clear project pipeline in both the CSM as well as the VSM. 
Hypothesis 6: The average expected project procurement cost for the government will decrease 
when the number of projects increases. 
3.5. The analytical background 
Given is a project pipeline with 𝑍 projects, a 𝑃-player sub-game with initial experience levels 
𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … 𝑒𝑃) and a strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃) in which each 𝑠𝑝 with 𝑝 ∈ {1,… , 𝑃} 
refers to player 𝑝’s strategy, expressed as a vector 𝑠𝑝 = (𝑖1(𝑠𝑝),𝑚1(𝑠𝑝), … , 𝑖𝑍(𝑠𝑝),𝑚𝑍(𝑠𝑝)). 
For this project pipeline and this strategy profile, the pay-off vector is dependent on the expected 
pay-off calculations of all projects in the pipeline. The outcome for the first project is 
straightforward, but the expectation of the second project will depend on who has won the first 
project, so that 𝑃 scenarios are created for the second project. For the third project, 𝑃2 scenarios 
need to be considered. The expected pay-off for player 𝑝 in sub-game 𝑒 and a three-project 
environment with ex ante strategy profile 𝑠 is decomposed as follows: 
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𝐸[𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒)] =∑∑𝑞𝑗
1(𝑠|𝑒) ∗ 𝑞𝑘
2(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1) ∗
𝑃
𝑘=1
(𝐸[𝜋𝑝
1(𝑠|𝑒)] + 𝛿1𝐸[𝜋𝑝
2(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1)]
𝑃
𝑗=1
+ 𝛿2𝐸[𝜋𝑝
3(𝑠|𝑒, 𝑦𝑗
1 = 1, 𝑦𝑘
2 = 1)]) 
In this resulting expected pay-off function, some new terms have been introduced: 
- 𝑞𝑗
𝑧 is the probability that player 𝑗 wins project 𝑧; 
- 𝑦𝑗
𝑧 is a binary variable that has value 1 if player 𝑗 has won project 𝑧 and indicates that the 
experience level of player 𝑗 is increased; 
- 𝜋𝑝
𝑧 refers to the pay-off for player 𝑝 in the tender for project 𝑧; 
- 𝛿𝑧−1 equals a discount factor to account for the time value of money. 
De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014) report the analytical pay-off calculation for a single-
project environment and most elements, apart from some notational differences, can be 
extrapolated to the multi-project environment. To determine the expected pay-off 𝐸[𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑠|𝑒′)] 
for player 𝑝 in project 𝑧, first define 𝑒′ = (𝑒1
′ , 𝑒2
′ , … 𝑒𝑃
′ ) as the combination of intermediate 
experience levels for this particular sub-game, taking into account the winners of the previous 
projects, also called the history. Figure 1 serves as an example for the two-player case with 
normal distributions.  
  
Figure 1: Illustration of the theoretical distributions. 𝑐1
′𝑧 and 𝑐2
′𝑧 are the cost probability distributions for 
two players, where player 2 has more experience than player 1. Player 1 applies a high investment choice 
and player 2 made a low investment choice and arrives in 𝑐2
𝑧. The players apply their preferred mark-up 
choice (a low mark-up for player 1 and a high mark-up for player 2) arriving in the respective bid 
probability distributions 𝑏1
𝑧 and 𝑏2
𝑧. 
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For a project with given risk parameters, the initial cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
′𝑧 for player 
𝑝 is a function of his experience level 𝑒𝑝
′ . As a result of assumptions 5 and 6, a more experienced 
bidder has an initial cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
′𝑧 with a smaller expected value and a smaller 
variance. Eventually, also the investment choice of the player modifies the probability 
distribution. Define 𝑠𝑧 = (𝑠1
𝑧 , 𝑠2
𝑧 , … , 𝑠𝑃
𝑧) as the action profile with regard to project 𝑧 and 
𝑠𝑝
𝑧 = (𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝),𝑚𝑧(𝑠𝑝)) the investment and mark-up choices with respect to project 𝑧. Combining 
the investment efforts 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝) and the experience level 𝑒𝑝
′  results in the cost probability 
distribution 𝑐𝑝
𝑧. The mark-up 𝑚𝑧(𝑠𝑝) is applied to an estimated cost that is generated from the 
cost probability distribution (Takano et al. 2014). Therefore, the mark-up choice shifts the cost 
probability distribution to the right, resulting in the bidding probability distribution 𝑏𝑝
𝑧 and 
associated cumulative bidding distribution 𝐵𝑝
𝑧. The probability that project 𝑧 is attributed to 
player 𝑝 equals: 
𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑠|𝑒′) = ∫ 𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝) [ ∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑘))
𝑃
𝑘=1,𝑝≠𝑘
]
+∞
−∞
𝑑𝑥𝑝 
Winning a tender results in receiving the proposed payment from the government and the actual 
cost and the monetary investment are subtracted to arrive at the pay-off. In the case of losing the 
tender, the pay-off equals the lost research cost, unless the government partly reimburses the 
losing bidders. Consequently, the expected pay-off for project 𝑧 in sub-game 𝑒′ is: 
𝐸[𝜋𝑝
𝑧(𝑠|𝑒′)] = 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑠|𝑒′)(𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝑝 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑛] − 𝐴𝑝
𝑧(𝑠𝑝 |𝑒𝑝
′ ) − 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)𝜇)
− (1 − 𝑞𝑝
𝑧(𝑠|𝑒′)) (1 − 𝑑)𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)𝜇 
with 
- 𝐴𝑝
𝑧(𝑠𝑝|𝑒𝑝
′ ) the actual cost, taking into account that player 𝑝 has won. It equals the expected 
value of the cost probability distribution 𝑐𝑝
𝑧 that belongs to the winning contractor 𝑝. If 
𝑔: ℝ² → ℝ is the function that reflects the fractional direct cost impact that results from 
player 𝑝’s experience level 𝑒𝑝
′  and the investment percentage 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝) related to strategy 𝑠𝑝, 
then we have 𝐴𝑝
𝑧 = (1 + 𝑔(𝑠𝑝, 𝑒𝑝
′ )) 𝜇;  
- 𝑑 the fraction of the investment cost that is reimbursed by the government;  
- 𝜇 a scaling factor; 
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- the term 𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝑝 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑛] that refers to the expected proposal that is made by player 𝑝 on 
the condition that he has won the tender with 𝐵𝑝?̃? a random variable from the bidding 
distribution  𝑏𝑝
𝑧.  
The latter term of the expected pay-off function is calculated as a conditional expectation: 
𝐸[𝐵𝑝?̃?|𝐵𝑝?̃? < 𝐵𝑘
?̃?,  ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑝] =  ∫ 𝑥𝑝
+∞
−∞
𝑏𝑝
𝑧(𝑥𝑝)∏ (1 − 𝐵𝑘
𝑧(𝑥𝑝))
𝑃
𝑘=1,𝑝≠𝑘
𝑞𝑝𝑧
𝑑𝑥𝑝 
Each contractor optimizes the expected pay-off for the entire project pipeline, which was 
formulated as 𝐸[𝜋𝑝(𝑠|𝑒)]. This results in the following system of 2 ∗ 𝑍 ∗ 𝑃 differential equations 
in the case of the VSM.  
{
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)]
𝜕𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝∗)
⁄ = 0
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑝(𝑠
∗|𝑒)]
𝜕𝑚𝑧(𝑠𝑝∗)
⁄ = 0
        ∀𝑧 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑍}, ∀𝑝 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑃} 
Under the CSM, a bidder applies the same strategy for each project in the pipeline (assumption 
10.1), which would add the constraints that 𝑖1(𝑠𝑝) = 𝑖2(𝑠𝑝) = ⋯ = 𝑖𝑍(𝑠𝑝) and 𝑚1(𝑠𝑝) =
𝑚2(𝑠𝑝) = ⋯ = 𝑚𝑍(𝑠𝑝), so that only two decision variables per player remain.  
As more flexibility in the choices of the mark-up and investment percentage is allowed, the 
number of decision variables in the optimization problem rises exponentially in the VSM. 
Additionally, albeit feasible, the probability and pay-off calculations are computationally 
intensive. Moreover, finding a Nash equilibrium is generally acknowledged to be a hard 
problem, which is proven by the complexity studies of Conitzer and Sandholm (2003) and 
Daskalakis et al. (2006). Therefore, a discretization of the strategy field, a simulation approach 
and meta-heuristics to approximate a candidate Nash equilibrium are introduced in the 
subsequent sections. 
3.6. The procurement simulation 
In order to reduce computation times and in order to gain insight into the pay-off 
distributions, the simulation procedure of De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014) is extended for 
the dynamic case. The inputs for the procedure to calculate the pay-off distribution consist of the 
initial experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) and the ex ante strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃). 
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Recall that the ex ante strategy 𝑠𝑝 consists of the investment and mark-up choices for all projects 
in the pipeline. In the consistent strategy model (CSM), the bidder opts for a single investment 
percentage 𝑖(𝑠𝑝)% and a mark-up percentage 𝑚(𝑠𝑝)% that is applied to all projects. In the 
variable strategy model (VSM) though, choices may differ along the project line so that 𝑠𝑝 =
(𝑖1(𝑠𝑝),𝑚1(𝑠𝑝),… , 𝑖𝑍(𝑠𝑝),𝑚𝑍(𝑠𝑝)). For all the projects, the knowledge impact assumption is 
related to the variance of the cost and bidding distributions and is implemented as:  𝜎𝑝
2 =
𝜎𝑝
2 (𝑒𝑝
′ , 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)) = 𝜇² (𝜎
2 + (𝛾𝑖𝑒
−𝜆𝑖(100𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)))
2
+ (𝛾𝑒𝑒
−𝜆𝑒𝑒𝑝
′
)
2
) with 𝑒′ the intermediate 
experience levels in stage 𝑧 of the game. This formula introduces the project complexity 
parameters. 𝛾𝑖 is the maximum impact of a lack of investment. The larger this parameter, the 
greater the importance of investment on the accuracy of the cost estimate. Equivalently, 𝛾𝑒 is the 
maximum variance contribution of a lack of experience and quantifies the knowledge advantage 
of being experienced. 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑒 represent the respective associated growth parameters. 𝜇 is a 
scaling parameter and will be set to € 1,000,000. The implementation of the cost impact 
assumption equivalently relies on diminishing scale effects and is given by: 
𝑔𝑝 = 𝑔𝑝 (𝑒𝑝
′ , 𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)) = 𝛽𝑖𝑒
−𝜇𝑖(100𝑖𝑧(𝑠𝑝)) + 𝛽𝑒𝑒
−𝜇𝑒𝑒𝑝
′
 with 𝛽𝑖 the innovation parameter related to 
the investment efforts and 𝛽𝑒 the efficiency parameter related to the experience.  
In order to determine the pay-off distributions of a particular strategy profile, a user-defined 
number of iterations 𝑚 is performed. A single iteration passes through the entire project pipeline. 
The input for the first project is 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) and the investment and mark-up decisions 
𝑖1(𝑠𝑝) and 𝑚1(𝑠𝑝) for the first project. Consider Gaussian cost and bidding distributions. The 
reference actual cost Ã1 is a random variable that is drawn from the distribution 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) with 
𝜇 = €1,000,000 and 𝜎𝑢
2 = (𝜇 ∗ 𝜎)2 and that is the same for all players. The final actual cost will 
be different, because it is related to the particular cost distribution of the winner of the tender. 
The expected project cost for 𝑝 results then from the linear transformation Ã𝑝
1 = Ã1(1 + 𝑔𝑝), 
which is set to the mean of the cost estimate function 𝑐𝑝
1 for player 𝑝. Hence, 𝑐𝑝
1 is a nested 
distribution (El Otmani and Maul 2009) of the form 𝑁 (𝜇(1 + 𝑔𝑝), (1 + 𝑔𝑝)
2
(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑝
2)). The 
contractor’s estimated cost 𝐶𝑝1̃ is randomly selected from 𝑐𝑝
1 and eventually, a contractor applies 
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the mark-up level 𝑚1(𝑠𝑝), resulting in the bid: 𝐵𝑝1̃ = (1 +𝑚1(𝑠𝑝))𝐶𝑝1̃. In summary, the form of 
the bidding probability distribution 𝑏𝑝
1 in this procurement simulation is: 
𝑁 (𝜇(1 +𝑚1(𝑠𝑝))(1 + 𝑔𝑝), (1 + 𝑚1(𝑠𝑝))
2
(1 + 𝑔𝑝)
2
(𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑝
2)) 
The minimum of these simulated bids is the winning proposal and its pay-off is determined, 
where the actual bid is 𝐴𝑤1̃  for winner 𝑤. The losers’ pay-offs equal the fraction of the pre-tender 
investments that are not reimbursed by the government. The winner’s experience level needs to 
be increased, resulting in a new experience vector 𝑒′ and the procedure is repeated for the second 
project and the resulting pay-offs are discounted (with the discount factor 𝛿𝑧−1 =
1
(1.05)𝑧−1
 and 𝑧 
the project number) and accumulated. The iteration finishes as soon as all projects from the 
pipeline have been tendered and then the next iteration starts. 
Knowing how the pay-offs are calculated, we need to find the equilibrium strategy profile that 
generates equilibrium pay-offs for all players. The next section conceptually describes the 
approximation algorithm. 
3.7. Equilibrium approximation algorithm 
In order to reduce the complexity of the analytical model, a discretization of the strategies has 
been introduced. A strategy 𝑠𝑝 for player 𝑝 consists of all investment and mark-up choices for 
the projects in the pipeline. Instead of allowing an infinite number of strategies, discrete numbers 
of investment and mark-up percentages are studied. 𝐼 investment choices, 𝑀 mark-up choices, 𝑃 
players and 𝑍 projects result in 𝐼 ∗ 𝑀 strategies and (𝐼 ∗ 𝑀)𝑃 strategy profiles in the CSM and 
(𝐼 ∗ 𝑀)𝑍 strategies and (𝐼 ∗ 𝑀)𝑍∗𝑃 strategy profiles in the VSM. In both models, the set of 
strategies for a player 𝑝 is referred to as 𝑆𝑝 and the set of strategy profiles is referred to as 
𝑆 = 𝑆1 × 𝑆2 × …× 𝑆𝑃. A strategy profile is given by 𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑃) and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 and the 
resulting pay-off vector by 𝑓 = (𝑓1(𝑠), 𝑓2(𝑠), … , 𝑓𝑃(𝑠)). 
The algorithm runs in a similar fashion as the strategy game in De Clerck and Demeulemeester 
(2014) and approximates the Nash equilibrium by determining a best response for player 𝑝 after 
first restricting the strategy space 𝑆−𝑝 for the competitors. Given the experience vector 𝑒 =
(𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃), we want to determine the best response for player 𝑝 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑃} with 
experience level 𝑒𝑝. The algorithm will perform a prequalification of the strategies for all the 
𝑃 − 1 competitors of player 𝑝. Initially, every competitor 𝑞 has a set of strategies 𝑆𝑞 and the 
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heuristic reduces this set to a set of shortlisted strategies 𝑅𝑞 with 𝑛 elements. The 
prequalification is a two-stage process: a homogeneous stage to grasp the project characteristics 
in the shortlisted strategies and a heterogeneous stage to emphasize the competition aspect. After 
the prequalification, the strategy game algorithm is executed.  
3.7.1. Homogeneous stage 
Player 𝑞 with experience level 𝑒𝑞 has a set of strategies 𝑆𝑞 at his possession. The 
homogeneous stage resembles a knock-out tournament. A predefined number of rounds 𝑟 is set 
and the experience levels are set equal to 𝑞’s experience level 𝑒𝑞 for all players. In the first round 
𝑃𝑟 strategies are selected randomly and divided in 𝑃𝑟−1 groups of 𝑃 strategies. For each group of 
strategies, the average pay-offs are calculated according to the dynamic simulation of Section 3.6 
and the best performing strategy continues to the next round where only 𝑃𝑟−1 strategies are 
remaining. The procedure continues until 𝑃 strategies remain and these are transferred to the set 
of shortlisted strategies 𝑅𝑞.  
3.7.2. Heterogeneous stage 
In this second stage, we keep the original experience vector 𝑒 and for each competitor 𝑞 an 
intermediate game is played in which all his strategies are assessed against random strategies for 
his opponents. In each iteration of the algorithm, random strategies from the complete set of 
strategies are selected for the competitors of player 𝑞. This results in the vector 𝑠−𝑞 which 
represents the strategy profile for the opponents of player 𝑞. Next, the expected pay-off and its 
variance is calculated for all the possible strategies from the set 𝑆𝑞 given the strategy profile 𝑠−𝑞 
for his competitors and the experience vector 𝑒. In the next iteration, new strategies are randomly 
selected for player 𝑞’s competitors. After a user-defined number of iterations 𝑘1, the pay-off 
distribution for each strategy of player 𝑞 is derived and the best strategies are selected to be part 
of the shortlisted strategy list 𝑅𝑞. 
3.7.3. Strategy game algorithm 
When the shortlisting is performed for each competitor 𝑞 of player 𝑝, the final assessment 
stage will start. For each iteration of the algorithm, strategies are selected for the competitors of 
player 𝑝. For competitor 𝑞, these strategies are generated from the respective shortlisted set 𝑅𝑞. 
This results in a strategy profile 𝑠−𝑝. Player 𝑝 will now calculate the pay-off for each of the 
strategies of his set 𝑆𝑝. In the next iteration, new strategies are selected for the opponents of 
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player 𝑝 and the pay-offs for this scenario are calculated. After 𝑘2 iterations, the average over all 
scenarios is calculated for each of the strategies from the set 𝑆𝑝 and the best performing strategy 
for player 𝑝 is assumed to be a good proxy for the equilibrium strategy for this player. 
4. Results 
4.1. Experimental setting 
The algorithm has been implemented in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the determinants of the CSM and the VSM. The reported strategy outcomes refer to 
the equilibrium strategy response for the first player, with initial experience level 𝑒1, of the 
experience vector 𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃). We will refer to the vector 𝑒−1 = (𝑒2, … , 𝑒𝑃) as the 
bidding situation for which we determine the equilibrium response of player 1.  
 Consistent strategy model Variable strategy model 
Number of investment levels 11 6 
Investment levels 0%,1%,2%,…,10% 0%,2%,4%,…,10% 
Number of mark-up levels 51 6 
Mark-up levels 0%,1%,2%,…,50% 0%,10%,20%,…,50% 
Number of players 2,3,4 2,3 
Experience levels 0,2,4,6,8,10 0,2,4,6,8,10 
Number of projects 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3 
Table 1: Model characteristics 
 
While the VSM allows greater flexibility, environments with more players and more projects 
inhibit the accuracy of the suggested equilibrium. However, in that case, the more manageable 
CSM could bring solace. In the experiment, different values for the model parameters are tested. 
Each combination of the parameter settings is called a scenario. The ex ante strategy equilibrium 
outcomes are compared for each scenario when the number of projects in the pipeline is 
increased. Consequently, the outcomes consist of paired observations and the paired samples t-
test is used to study the differences. Three assumptions are important for the paired t-test: 
random sampling, normal distribution of the response variables and interval or ratio data. The 
paired t-test is rather robust for the normal distribution assumption. However, we are dealing 
with experimental data with only a limited number of discrete strategies and one should be 
careful for applying the parametric paired t-test. Therefore, the equivalent non-parametric 
Wilcoxon signed rank test has been used, but the findings are identical. In this set-up with 
discrete strategies and unique strategy equilibria, marginal effects will not be revealed. The 
results are divided in two parts. Section 4.2 defines a base case and focuses on the interaction 
between government policies (i.e., the number of projects and the bid cost reimbursement) and 
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the investment-related project risk. Section 4.3 adds changes in the other model parameters of the 
VSM and reports the results of an extensive parameter sensitivity study. Table 2 lists the 
parameter values. 
Parameter Interpretation Values  
(Section 4.2) 
Values  
(Section 4.3) 
𝜎 Uncontrollable project risk 0.05 0.05 
𝛾𝑒 Maximum risk impact of a lack of experience 0.05 0.05,0.1 
𝛾𝑖  Maximum risk impact of a lack of investment 0.1,0.2 0.05,0.1,0.2 
𝜆𝑒 Experiential learning rate 0.25 0.25 
𝜆𝑖 Investment learning rate 0.25 0.25 
𝛽𝑒 Experiential cost disadvantage 0.1 0.05,0.1 
𝛽𝑖 Investment cost disadvantage 0.05 0.05 
𝜇𝑒 Experiential cost decrease rate 0.25 0.25 
𝜇𝑖  Investment cost decrease rate 0.25 0.25 
𝑑 Government compensation level 0,0.1,0.2,…,0.9 0,0.3,0.6,0.9 
𝛿𝑧 Discount rate 1/1.05 1/1.05 
Table 2: Parameter values used in the models 
4.2. Base case analysis 
Motivated by the practical importance of the assessment of governmental policies, this section 
looks into the impact of the introduction of extra projects and bid cost reimbursements in a low-
risk and high-risk base case scenario. For a high-risk PPP project, our experimental design uses a 
value for the 𝛾𝑖 parameter of 0.20 and for the low-risk base case, this value is set to 0.10. For the 
development of this base-case scenario, we opted for the assumptions that investment has mainly 
a knowledge impact and that experience has a cost impact.  
4.2.1. Consistent strategy model 
Table 3 reports the average investment and mark-up differences over all scenarios in the CSM 
experiment with the number of projects going from one to five. Recall that in the CSM the action 
choice is said to be stable for the entire pipeline which is a quite conservative approach. 
Concerning the investment levels, there is statistical significance in favor of decreasing 
investments in the four-player case, but the economic significance is little. Additionally, the 
results show a significant positive investment impact for three players in the low-risk base case. 
This result is mainly attributed to a 0.11% (p=0.04) and a 0.41% (p=1.9*10
-10
) average 
investment raise by inexperienced players when moving from a single-project to, respectively, a 
two- and a five- project pipeline. Furthermore, extra projects lead to decreasing mark-up 
percentages for all players in two- and three-player environments in the CSM, but the four-player 
result is ambiguous (Table 3).  
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CSM 
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 𝑍 = 4 𝑍 = 5 
2 players 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0194 
(0.6920) 
-0.0139 
(0.7618) 
-0.0750 
(0.1036) 
-0.0056 
(0.9061) 
0.20 
-0.025 
(0.6058) 
0.0139 
(0.7643) 
0.0222 
(0.6320) 
0.0167 
(0.7155) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-0.4444*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.7083*** 
(5.5*10
-7
) 
-0.8333*** 
(5.1*10
-9
) 
-0.9583*** 
(2.4*10
-10
) 
0.20 
-0.6389*** 
(4.65*10
-5
) 
-0.9722*** 
(7.82*10
-10
) 
-1.125*** 
(1.47*10
-13
) 
-1.3056*** 
(3.04*10
-15
) 
3 players 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0191 
(0.6272) 
0 
(1) 
0.0587** 
(0.0170) 
0.0627** 
(0.0138) 
0.20 
-0.0063 
(0.8349) 
-0.0341 
(0.2794) 
0.0317 
(0.3214) 
0.0429 
(0.1865) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-0.5476*** 
(2.6*10
-8
) 
-0.8691*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.1468*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.4286*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
0.20 
-0.2063 
(0.3225) 
-0.4722** 
(0.0375) 
-1.1349*** 
(2.35*10
-6
) 
-1.4365*** 
(6.31*10
-9
) 
4 players 
Investment 
0.10 
-0.0515*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0378*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0372*** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0491*** 
(0.0004) 
0.20 
-0.0301 
(0.1342) 
0.0146 
(0.4776) 
0.0024 
(0.9081) 
0.0304 
(0.1414) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
0.3646*** 
(4.7*10
-5
) 
0.3125*** 
(0.0006) 
0.2946*** 
(0.0017) 
0.2307** 
(0.0158) 
0.20 
0.0506 
(0.7493) 
-0.2083 
(0.2013) 
-0.2798* 
(0.0939) 
-0.5804*** 
(0.0006) 
Table 3: Increase (+) or decrease (-) in the investment and mark-up percentages, with associated p-values 
for the two-sample t-test for the CSM, with respect to a single-project environment. 
In a single-project context, the mark-up trend was negatively correlated with the experience 
level for the three- and four-player setting and slightly positive when two players are competing. 
The sign of this trend remains unchanged with the introduction of additional projects, but the 
slope changes, as mark-up responses to the longer pipeline vary with respect to the experience 
levels. In general, the inexperienced bidder makes the largest mark-up reduction.  
The CSM experiment also tests different government compensation levels. From practice and 
from De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014), we learn that compensations have the most 
prospering results for high risk projects in three-player settings. According to the experiments, 
the response to the introduction of compensations is the same, regardless of the number of 
projects in the pipeline. Two-player results show a significant increase in investment, but also a 
slight increase in mark-ups when compensations are included. The three-player environment 
indicates an upward investment trend and a significant downward mark-up trend, while 
compensations have a convex investment impact and a concave mark-up impact in the four-
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player case, so that only excessively high and costly compensations have a positive effect. The 
interaction between the number of projects and the government compensation is only significant 
in the three-player case of the CSM (p=0.04 for investment and p=1.7*10
-5
 for mark-up) 
meaning that lower compensations already lead to a drop in the mark-ups, making the market 
more competitive.  
4.2.2. Variable strategy model 
The VSM adds complexity, so only a limited horizon of at most three projects has been 
studied. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results for differences in the investment and mark-ups for 
the first project of the 𝑍-project pipeline and for the averages over the given pipeline. The two-
player case supports the hypothesis of the investment increase for the first project in a two-
project pipeline, but looking at the averages only the increase in the high-risk environment is 
significant. The effects are more outspoken for inexperienced bidders. Moreover, significance 
disappears in a three-project environment. An explanation could be that the bidder who 
determines the ex ante strategy has a great belief in at least winning one project and in this vein 
counts on gained experience for which he does not need to invest now. Also for the mark-up 
change, the drop is more significant for the first project.  
VSM  
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 
(a) First project w.r.t. 
𝑍 = 1 
(b) Average of pipeline  
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 3 
2 players 
Investment 
0.10 
0.1611** 
(0.0158) 
0.0556 
(0.5236) 
0.0778 
(0.1565) 
0.1000 
(0.1489) 
0.20 
0.1056* 
(0.0970) 
-0.0556 
(0.5428) 
0.125** 
(0.0230) 
0.1037 
(0.1405) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-2.0278*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-5.0556*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-1.2222*** 
(1.25*10
-9
) 
-2.2963*** 
(4.12*10
-14
) 
0.20 
-4.1944*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-6.1111*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-2.6667*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-3.8148*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
Table 4: Increase (+) or decrease (-) in investment and mark-up percentages, with associated p-values. 
The single-project strategy is compared with (a) the choices for the first project of the pipeline and with 
(b) the average choices of the entire pipeline. 
In the three-player environment, the introduction of an extra project does not seem to 
guarantee prospering results: an investment decrease is expected for highly complex projects, 
together with a mark-up increase. Nevertheless, this result is mainly caused by players with 
𝑒𝑝 = {0,2}, which deviates from the CSM results where an increase was reported for long 
pipelines.  
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VSM  
∆ in % 
(p-value) 
𝛾𝑖 
(a) First project w.r.t. 
𝑍 = 1 
(b) Average of pipeline 
w.r.t. Z=1 
𝑍 = 2 𝑍 = 2 
3 players 
Investment 
0.10 
0.0413 
(0.1959) 
0.0325 
(0.2330) 
0.20 
-0.1048*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.07619** 
(0.0196) 
Mark-up 
0.10 
-1.5000*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-0.6865*** 
(1.76*10
-11
) 
0.20 
0.5968** 
(0.0119) 
0.5595*** 
(0.0039) 
Table 5: Increase (+) or decrease (-) in investment and mark-up percentages, with associated p-values. 
The single-project strategy is compared with (a) the choices for the first project of the pipeline and with 
(b) the average choices of the entire pipeline. 
Besides, the VSM supports the finding related to the compensations: there is only interaction 
between government reimbursements and the number of projects in the three-player case, so that  
a 60% compensation for instance could give extra incentives for inexperienced players to refrain 
from investing less when a new project was introduced. Consequently, compensations get a 
second feature: not only do they level the playing field, but they also inhibit decreasing the ex 
ante investment in the dynamic case. Moreover, the extra expenses that result from the 
reimbursements are compensated through the increased price competition in the multi-project 
setting.  
In this vein, Table 6 reports the difference between the total expected government cost of the 
two-project pipeline and the total expected government cost in the case a single project is 
tendered two times consecutively. In order to make a valid comparison and to translate the 
single-project government cost into one that is equivalent to the two-project logic, two 
intermediate results have been developed. For the first project, the initial sub-game is represented 
by (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3) and the government cost is calculated. For tendering a second project without a 
former pipeline, three scenarios might have occurred: (𝑒1
′ , 𝑒2, 𝑒3), (𝑒1, 𝑒2
′ , 𝑒3) or (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑒3
′), for 
which the prime indicates the updated experience level for the player who has previously won. 
For the worst case method, the expected government cost of the most expensive sub-game is 
discounted and added to the cost of the previous project, while for the weighted method an equal 
probability is attributed to each sub-game. The expected government cost is significantly lower if 
there is a project pipeline, regardless of the project risk or the number of players. The absolute 
values of the differences are greater in the two-player case, especially for risky projects. On the 
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contrary, it are the less risky projects that have a greater contribution to the government cost 
decrease in the three-player situation. 
VSM 𝛾𝑖 
Worst case 
method 
Weighted 
method 
2 players 
0.10 
-36,345*** 
(1.67*10
-6
) 
-27,946*** 
(4.77*10
-6
) 
0.20 
-69,922*** 
(7.43*10
-9
) 
-58,436*** 
(2.36*10
-8
) 
All 
scenarios 
-49,633*** 
(3.16*10
-13
) 
-43,191*** 
(9.69*10
-12
) 
3 players 
0.10 
-28,282*** 
(2.58*10
-15
) 
-26,026*** 
(7.01*10
-14
) 
0.20 
-8,326*** 
(1.64*10
-6
) 
-4,172*** 
(0.0037) 
All 
scenarios 
-18,304*** 
(<2.2*10
-16
) 
-15,099*** 
(1.82*10
-13
) 
Table 6: Absolute differences and associated p-values in tendering two times a single project or in the 
case of a two-project pipeline. 
4.3. Parameter sensitivity analysis for the VSM 
The base case analysis allows one to closely look into particular governmental policies, but 
this section focuses on a sensitivity analysis of the model parameters as shown in Table 2 and 
extends the single-project results of De Clerck and Demeulemeester (2014). The optimal strategy 
that results from the VSM consists of the ex ante budgeted investment choices and mark-up 
choices for all the projects in the pipeline.  
4.3.1. Within-strategy dynamics 
Table 7 reports the dynamics within the optimal strategy and summarizes the average 
differences between the investment willingness percentages and the required mark-up for the 
first and the second project in the pipeline. The scenario-by-scenario comparison in the two-
player case concludes that the ex ante investment percentages are higher for the first project than 
for the second project. This means that a contractor believes that, on average, he will have to 
invest less in the second project than for the first project. Conditioning on the experience levels 
could not guarantee significant results for all the levels. Moving towards three shortlisted 
bidders, a small significance is attributed to the opposite finding, but for the majority of 
experience levels, neither the paired t-test, nor the Wilcoxon signed-rank test proves significant 
ex ante differences. On the contrary, the mark-up dynamics are more outspoken. For both the 
two-player case as well as the three-player case, the optimal mark-up is expected to be set 
significantly higher for the second project than for the first project. 
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VSM 2 players 3 players 
Measured difference 
(𝑍 = 2) 
Absolute 
mean value of 
the difference 
Δ (in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
Absolute 
mean value of 
the difference 
Δ (in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
𝑖2
𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
∗) − 𝑖1
𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
∗) -0.0671** 0.0272 0.0273 0.0251* 0.0945 0.0937 
|𝑒1 = 0 -0.1458* 0.0623 0.0631 0.0595* 0.0548 0.0546 
|𝑒1 = 2 -0.0486 0.5112 0.5113 0.0258 0.4917 0.4968 
|𝑒1 = 4 -0.0694 0.3412 0.3413 0.0694* 0.0662 0.0659 
|𝑒1 = 6 -0.2014*** 0.0057 0.0059 0.0119 0.7465 0.7454 
|𝑒1 = 8 0 1 1 -0.0198 0.6110 0.6126 
|𝑒1 = 10 0.0625 0.4142 0.4137 0.0040 0.9175 0.9172 
𝑚2
𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
∗) − 𝑚1
𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝑠1
∗) 1.4757*** <2.2*10-16 <2.2*10
-16 
0.6134*** <2.2*10
-16 <2.2*10
-16 
|𝑒1 = 0 2.5347*** <2.2*10
-16 5.13*10
-16 
0.6448*** 0.0069 0.0065 
|𝑒1 = 2 1.8403*** 8.02*10
-10 2.52*10
-9 
0.8929*** 1.58*10-5 5.90*10-7 
|𝑒1 = 4 1.2153*** 1.07*10
-5 1.44*10
-5 
0.7540*** 1.88*10-5 1.99*10-6 
|𝑒1 = 6 0.9375*** 0.0002 0.0003 0.4464*** 0.0009 0.0005 
|𝑒1 = 8 1.2500*** 1.28*10
-5 1.71*10
-5 
0.4167*** 0.0018 0.0010 
|𝑒1 = 10 1.0764*** 0.0003 0.003 0.5258*** 9.89*10
-6 5.19*10
-6 
Table 7: Average differences in the investment and mark-up choices within the optimal strategy for the 
two-project pipeline. 
4.3.2. First-project comparison 
More interestingly, Table 8 reports the results of the scenario-specific differences between the 
preferred pre-tender investment level and the mark-up level for the first project in the two-project 
environment and the single-project environment respectively. The average results over all 
scenarios are highly significant for the mark-up. The mark-ups of the first project drop 
considerably when a second project is introduced in both the two- as well as the three-player 
situation, with an average decrease of 2.40% and 1.05% respectively. For both cases, the 
absolute impact is greater for inexperienced players than for more experienced ones. Looking at 
the investment levels, the statistical tests confirm that pre-tender investments ought to be higher 
when a second project is added to the pipeline. For the three-player case, no significant overall 
impact could be shown, but inexperienced players will now invest less than when the 
government has no project agenda. This might be explained through the fact that contractors will 
spread the investment efforts more over the pipeline of projects. Nevertheless, a comparison of 
the results of the average investment percentage and mark-up percentage with the choices in the 
case that there is no pipeline did only support the mark-up drop (-1.7% in the two-player case 
and -0.7% in the three-player case), while the average investment over the pipeline is only 
significantly higher for the two-player case (+0.1%). The average pay-off expectation per project 
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drops with € 5,137 in the two-player environment and with € 2,221 in the three-player case 
according to the simulation.  
VSM  2 players 3 players 
 
Measured 
difference 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
Absolute mean 
value of the 
difference Δ 
(in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
Absolute 
mean value of 
the difference 
Δ (in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
Investment 
All scenarios 0.1585*** 3.76*10
-8 
4.35*10
-8 
-0.0073 0.6178 0.6013 
𝑒1 = 0 0.3194*** 8.57*10
-6 1.16*10
-5 
-0.1012*** 0.0018 0.0018 
𝑒1 = 2 0.2222*** 0.0011 0.0012 -0.0893** 0.0181 0.0184 
𝑒1 = 4 0.0347 0.6125 0.6122 -0.0079 0.8210 0.8078 
𝑒1 = 6 0.2153*** 0.0037 0.0039 0.0060 0.8687 0.8738 
𝑒1 = 8 0.0278 0.6956 0.6952 0.1052*** 0.0047 0.0049 
𝑒1 = 10 0.1319* 0.0586 0.0596 0.0437 0.2189 0.2215 
Mark-up 
All scenarios -2.4016*** <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
-1.0516*** <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝑒1 = 0 -3.5069*** <2.2*10
-16 <2.2*10
-16 
-1.3988*** 9.89*10-8 1.10*10-7 
𝑒1 = 2 -2.3958*** <2.2*10
-16 6.88*10
-16 
-1.2401*** 1.91*10-7 3.16*10-9 
𝑒1 = 4 -2.3264*** 2.10*10
-15 4.87*10
-14 
-1.0417*** 4.87*10-9 1.01*10-10 
𝑒1 = 6 -2.2222*** 1.31*10
-14 2.17*10
-13 
-0.9722*** 3.97*10-12 5.19*10-13 
𝑒1 = 8 -2.2917*** 9.29*10
-15 1.63*10
-13 
-0.7440*** 7.53*10-9 4.66*10-10 
𝑒1 = 10 -1.6667*** 3.93*10
-8 8.16*10
-8 
-0.9127*** 1.88*10-15 7.46*10-16 
Table 8: Differences between the investment and mark-up choice for the first project of a two-project 
pipeline and the choices in a single-project environment. 
The previous results consider the entire dataset over all scenarios, but a sensitivity analysis 
that compares the scenarios, helps to better understand the parameter dependency of the findings. 
The ANOVA output in Appendix reveals the sensitivity results. Both tables compare the 
difference in the investment and mark-up levels for the first project in a single-project and a two-
project environment for the two- and three-player case respectively. A look into the main effects 
reveals that the bidding behavior responds differently to the introduction of a second project for 
the two- and three- player case.  
4.3.3. Project complexity 
Table 9 digs into the project complexity in the two-player setting. Omitting interaction effects, 
projects with a limited complexity and that do not require a lot of research (𝛾𝑖=0.05) incur a 
significant increase of 0.25% (p=9.6*10
-6
) in the investment willingness. The increase in 
investment willingness drops to 0.18% (p=2.6*10
-4
) when the share of the variance that is related 
to investment rises to 0.10. In the cases for which 𝛾𝑖 reaches 0.20, the investment willingness is 
not significantly influenced by one extra project. In the two-player case, the mark-up results are 
also significantly related to the project’s complexity. Mark-ups for project categories with larger 
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risk features drop more, ceteris paribus. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the mark-up for the 
first project has become increasing in the experience level in the two-project setting, while it was 
relatively stable in the single-project setting. Especially for complex projects, experienced 
players require higher mark-ups than their inexperienced counterparts.  
VSM  
2 players 
Investment Mark-up 
Measured 
difference 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
Absolute 
mean value 
of the 
difference Δ 
(in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
Absolute 
mean value 
of the 
difference Δ 
(in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.05 0.2500*** 9.65*10
-7 
1.27*10
-7 
-0.8854*** 2.29*10
-12 
6.33*10
-12 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.10 0.1771*** 0.0002 0.0003 -2.2569*** <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.20 0.0486 0.3321 0.3318 -4.0625*** <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
Table 9: Ceteris paribus sensitivity results for project complexity in a two-player case with the difference 
in investment and mark-up percentages between a two-project setting and a single-project setting. 
   
   
Figure 2: Interaction plots of project complexity and the experience level in the two-player setting with 
independent variable the choices for the first project in a two-project pipeline (left), the single-project 
strategy (middle) and their difference (right). 
This differs from the three-player setting of Figure 3 in which the downward mark-up trend 
for increasing experience levels remains. When the impact of the knowledge parameter 𝛾𝑖 is 
studied in a three-player environment, the investments are only significantly raised for projects 
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of medium complexity and once projects become too risky, the introduction of an extra project 
results in a drop (0.09% on average) of the investment willingness and no significant drops in 
mark-ups are apparent. However, for lower risk projects, the mark-up impact is largest, 
especially for inexperienced players.  
   
Figure 3: Interaction plots of project complexity and the experience level in the three-player setting with 
independent variable the mark-up choice for the first project in a two-project pipeline (left), the single-
project strategy (middle) and their difference (right).  
VSM 
3 players 
Investment Mark-up 
Measured 
difference 
w.r.t. 𝑍 = 1 
Absolute 
mean value 
of the 
difference Δ 
(in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
Absolute 
mean value 
of the 
difference Δ 
(in %) 
Paired t-test 
p-value of 
𝐻0: Δ = 0 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
p-value 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.05 0.0228 0.2954 0.3074 -2.5595*** <2.2*10
-16 
<2.2*10
-16 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.10 0.0466* 0.0663 0.0665 -0.7589*** <2.2*10
-16 
2.91*10
-16 
𝛾𝑖 = 0.20 -0.0913*** 0.0012 0.0012 0.1637 0.3274 0.2635 
𝑑 = 0 0.0450 0.1019 0.1063 -0.8399*** 9.26*10-6 1.77*10-6 
𝑑 = 0.30 -0.0225 0.3973 0.3854 -0.4034** 0.0131 0.0030 
𝑑 = 0.60 0.0608** 0.0428 0.0429 -1.3228*** <2.2*10-16 <2.2-10-16 
𝑑 = 0.90 -0.1124*** 0.0005 0.0005 -1.6402*** <2.2*10-16 <2.2*10-16 
Table 10: Ceteris paribus sensitivity results for project complexity and government compensation in a 
three-player case with the difference in investment and mark-up percentages between a two-project 
setting and a single-project setting.   
4.3.4. Government compensation 
As the bidding behavior is rather levelled, the government compensation is not necessary to 
increase competition in the case where two bidders are shortlisted for a single project. Increasing 
the number of projects in the pipeline does not modify the dynamics. The introduction of a 
second project automatically triggers fiercer competition and less experienced players lower the 
mark-ups, that now converge towards the mark-ups of the incumbents.  
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In the three-player setting with one project, government compensations are a helpful tool to 
increase competition. Table 10 suggests that the effect of government compensations is 
influenced by the introduction of a second project in the pipeline. Although only a limited 
number of compensation levels have been tested, a 60% compensation will for instance result in 
a 0.06% higher investment level and a 1.32% lower mark-up, relative to its respective single-
project scenario. 
4.3.5. Hypotheses    
In conclusion, it is necessary to look how the hypotheses are backed up by the experimental 
findings. Unfortunately, the model could not provide a definite answer for Hypothesis 1. The 
VSM for the two-player case slightly supports the investment increase, but no investment change 
has been identified in the three-player case. However, all models support Hypothesis 2. A 
pipeline does have a beneficial impact on the mark-up, which also results in lower procurement 
costs for the government (Hypothesis 6). The variation within the ex ante strategy (Hypothesis 3) 
was supported for the mark-ups, but only limited evidence could be given for the investments. A 
similar conclusion is reached for Hypothesis 4: markets become more competitive from a mark-
up perspective when more projects are introduced, but it does not necessarily serve as a 
mechanism to level the playing field in a multi-player case. Therefore, government 
compensations could still help in three-player settings with complex projects to increase the 
competition (Hypothesis 5). 
5. Discussion 
Respondent Function Region of expertise 
A Partnerships Victoria Victoria (Australia) 
B Executive director of investment company Australia and other developed 
countries 
C Advisor in research and advisory institution for 
construction sector 
Belgium 
D Construction lawyer Australia 
E Independent PPP consultant South Africa 
F Independent PPP consultant Czech Republic 
G Partner at consultancy firm Australia 
H Independent legal PPP consultant Europe 
Table 11: List of respondents 
Table 11 lists the profile of some of the respondents that have been interviewed to give their 
view on the modeling and theoretical impact of a pipeline introduction. Markets significantly 
differ in their respective pipelines. Canada has a reputation of keeping the market going, while 
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the pipeline of the Private Finance Initiative in the UK dropped off (respondent B). In Australia, 
the state Victoria tries to maintain a pipeline and communicates the prospects of future 
opportunities when projects are launched, under the belief that a strong pipeline results in new 
competition and higher investments (respondents A, D). Respondents C and E, on the other hand, 
claim that it is not always evident to have a continuity of projects due to the longevity and the 
magnitude of the budgetary requirements. Finally, respondent F claims that the number of 
projects should not exceed market capacity. All respondents were in favor of a project pipeline. 
According to the respondents, but not entirely supported by the theoretical findings, a first 
advantage is that it results in more investments in initial projects and that the total investment is 
spread over different projects (respondent D). The private sector is willing to invest more in non-
project fixed costs and better plan its financial strategy (respondent F) and human resources can 
be employed for a longer time (respondent D). The experience of respondent A learned that 
consortia recently have a more consistent structure, apart from the financial partner. Moreover, 
the government benefits from a pipeline because of the increased competition and the lower 
procurement cost which is in line with the experimental findings. The increased competition puts 
of course a ceiling on the contractors’ profits (respondent B). Another downside is the danger of 
the “lazy Susan” approach in established markets: the work goes around and might be attributed 
to the desperate contractor (respondent B). Often consortia are not substantial enough to carry 
out more than two projects at the same time, so governments need to be conscious about the 
magnitude of the project and about spreading the work (respondent B, D).  
The respondents expect more competition and the majority expects higher investments in the 
initial projects. Consequently, all respondents explicitly favor a long-term project pipeline over 
short-term bid cost compensations. Respondent H stipulates that pipelines will be better to attract 
overseas contractors, but respondents A and B claim that the pipeline should be visible and 
trustworthy. Nevertheless, some respondents believe in the applicability of compensations. 
Firstly, it could be necessary if it is impossible to attract two bidders or when important 
informational or innovative added value can be created (respondents A,D). In this vein, 
compensations create a larger pool of capital (respondent D). Nevertheless, respondent G fears 
the undue difference in the treatment of bidders, so that strict limitations and guidelines are 
necessary. Last but not least, respondents D and H put forward that governments should first 
attempt to decrease the bidding costs.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper presents the results of a theoretical study of the PPP procurement mechanism. 
More particularly, it assessed how contractors change their ex ante bidding strategy in the case a 
pipeline of projects is introduced. The tendering processes are time-consuming and often 
overlapping, so contractors will make an initial budget how to spread their bidding efforts over 
the different stages of the game, in the belief that experience of winning a project will benefit the 
competitive position in later tenders. The mechanism has been translated in an analytical auction 
procurement framework for which a computerized experiment has been developed to identify the 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The introduction of extra projects mainly has a mark-up impact and 
consequently reduces the expected government procurement cost. Consequently, from a 
government perspective and besides from cementing the project agenda, it might also be 
beneficial to split up large projects into smaller parts as long as there are no coordination issues. 
The model could not support the hypothesis that contractors will put more effort in the bid 
preparation. Instead, contractors take the expected profits of an experiential gain into account for 
the ex ante strategy determination and therefore directly increase the probability of winning by 
decreasing the mark-up for initial projects. Especially in three- and four-player markets, 
appropriate incentives are necessary to assure competitive forces. In this way, they prevent the 
market to become saturated or that mature players become too comfortable with their 
competitive advantage. Therefore, governments should first try to reduce bidding costs that add 
no value, like excessive design requirements or lengthy negotiation processes. Moreover, they 
should reward bidders who have invested more in research. If necessary, bid compensations 
could trigger additional investment incentives. 
This study has important limitations. Firstly, marginal effects could not be revealed because 
of the discretization of strategies. Moreover, the study relies on approximate equilibria and 
simulation outcomes. This leads to a lot of flexibility but prevents us from arriving at closed-
form analytical expressions. Moreover, empirical data would highly assist in shaping the 
distributions, but are hard to obtain in the competitive PPP market where high values are at stake. 
Future research could look into the strictly sequential model, where projects are tendered 
consecutively and consortia may change strategies with respect to the current state of the game. 
The relaxation of the assumption that investments are project-specific and the possibility of 
randomly arriving bidders could be investigated. In that case, pre-tender investments may 
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contribute to the knowledge base of future projects. Ultimately, the practical applicability could 
benefit from the introduction of capacity constraints. Furthermore, this cutting-edge procurement 
application offers new challenging research opportunities for the mathematical and experimental 
auction field. 
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Appendix: ANOVA output of experimental results 
 Analysis of variance table – 2 players  
  (𝑖1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑖1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=1
 (𝑚1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑚1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=1
 
Variable Df Mean Sq F value p-value Sign Mean Sq F value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑒  1 0.4 0.28 0.5946  229.7 12.03 0.0005 *** 
𝛾𝑖  1 12.0 8.67 0.0033 *** 2889.0 151.33 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛽𝑒   1 2.0 1.41 0.2352  259.8 13.61 0.0002 *** 
𝑑  1 3.5 2.54 0.1113  65.1 3.41 0.0650 * 
𝑒1  1 7.4 5.35 0.0208 ** 380.6 19.94 8.5*10
-6 *** 
𝑒−1  5 2.6 1.91 0.0905 * 232.4 12.17 1.3*10
-11 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛾𝑖  1 3.4 2.45 0.1178  93.0 4.87 0.0274 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑒   1 2.8 2.05 0.1520  0.5 0.03 0.8688  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.0 0.02 0.8980  3.3 0.18 0.6756  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 1.2 0.90 0.3437  82.5 4.32 0.0377 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 0.8 0.60 0.6990  12.1 0.63 0.6760  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑒   1 7.0 5.03 0.0250 ** 15.9 0.83 0.3617  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑑  1 3.7 2.66 0.1033  40.7 2.13 0.1442  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 13.4 9.72 0.0019 *** 138.8 7.27 0.0071 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 3.4 2.49 0.0295 ** 158.0 8.28 9.7*10
-8 *** 
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 4.7 3.42 0.0645 * 14.2 0.74 0.3889  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1   1 4.1 2.94 0.0867 * 11.0 0.57 0.4488  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 4.2 3.01 0.0104 ** 97.7 5.12 0.0001 *** 
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.5 0.33 0.5663  28.3 1.48 0.2233  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 1.8 1.32 0.2539  41.3 2.16 0.0557 * 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒−1  5 0.8 0.59 0.7075  12.6 0.66 0.6553  
residuals 1682 1.4    19.09    
Table A.1: ANOVA output for the differences in the investment and mark-up choices for the first project 
in a two-project setting with respect to a single-project setting. 
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 Analysis of variance table – 3 players  
  (𝑖1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑖1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=1
 (𝑚1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=2
− (𝑚1(𝑠1
∗))
𝑍=1
 
Variable Df Mean Sq F value p-value Sign Mean Sq F value p-value Sign 
𝛾𝑒  1 3.4 2.70 0.1004  11.2 0.35 0.5536  
𝛾𝑖  1 17.0 13.35 0.0003 *** 6701.1 210.39 <2.2*10
-16 *** 
𝛽𝑒   1 9.8 7.75 0.0054 *** 222.5 6.99 0.0082 ** 
𝑑  1 11.4 9.00 0.0027 *** 833.3 26.16 3.2*10-7 *** 
𝑒1  1 25.1 19.80 8.8*10
-6 *** 229.0 7.19 0.0073 ** 
𝑒−1  20 1.7 1.30 0.1638  96.2 3.02 6.6*10
-6 *** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛾𝑖  1 0.3 0.21 0.6474  139.8 4.39 0.0362 ** 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑒   1 0.0 0.03 0.8551  11.2 0.35 0.5536  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.8 0.60 0.4380  102.4 3.22 0.0730 * 
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1  1 1.2 0.93 0.3361  34.5 1.08 0.2981  
𝛾𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 0.9 0.70 0.8342  30.9 0.97 0.4959  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝛽𝑒   1 3.3 2.61 0.1061  32.5 1.02 0.3121  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑑  1 14.7 11.53 0.0007 *** 0.1 0.00 0.9522  
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒1  1 0.0 0.01 0.9189  1910.3 59.98 1.1*10
-14 *** 
𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.8 1.44 0.0909 * 96.1 3.02 6.7*10
-6 *** 
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑑  1 0.1 0.09 0.7595  26.8 0.84 0.3592  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒1   1 0.9 0.71 0.3999  0.1 0.00 0.9468  
𝛽𝑒 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 0.8 0.61 0.9105  32.5 1.02 0.4334  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒1  1 4.6 3.59 0.0582 * 48.1 1.51 0.2191  
𝑑 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.6 1.28 0.1786  93.1 2.92 1.3*10
-5 *** 
𝑒1 ∗ 𝑒−1  20 1.9 1.53 0.0624 * 46.7 1.47 0.0825 * 
residuals 5912 1.3    31.9    
Table A.2: ANOVA output for the differences in the investment and mark-up choices for the first project 
in a two-project setting with respect to a single-project setting. 
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